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Abstract Democratic legitimacy is rarely associated with
private governance. After all, private actors are not legiti-
mized through elections by a demos. Instead of abandoning
democratic principles when entering the private sphere of
governance, however, this article argues in favour of
employing alternative criteria of democracy in assess-
ments. Specifically, this article uses the criteria of partici-
pation, transparency and accountability to evaluate the
democratic legitimacy of private food retail governance
institutions. It pursues this evaluation of the democratic
legitimacy of these institutions against the background of
their ambivalent impact on the sustainability of the global
agrifood system. The paper refers to a range of cases of
private retail standards with different governance structures
and substantial foci to illustrate its argument.
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Introduction
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the democratic
legitimacy of private food governance institutions in the
retail sector. We concentrate on private retail standards
because this is a form of private food governance that has
expanded dramatically over the last couple of decades.
Moreover, previous studies have found that private retail
governance is associated with highly ambivalent implica-
tions for the sustainability of the global agrifood system
(Fuchs et al. 2009). Accordingly, this form of governance
urgently needs to be evaluated regarding its democratic
justifiability.
The paper starts from the recognition that global food
and agricultural governance is increasingly being created
not only by (inter)governmental actors but also by private
actors. In the food sector, as elsewhere, next to traditional
command-and-control, alternative forms of regulation are
being explored, such as self-regulation, co-regulation,
management-based regulation and other private systems of
governance (Aalders and Wilthagen 1997; Braithwaite
1982; Coglianese and Lazer 2003; Furger 1997; Gunn-
ingham and Sinclair 1999; Hutter 2001:9–10). In these new
forms of regulation, private actors are assuming pivotal
roles in terms of rule-making, monitoring compliance, and
enforcement. Food industry and retail corporations, in
particular, have become key players in the governance of
the global food system through the creation of governance
institutions such as private standards, corporate social
responsibility initiatives (CSR) and public–private or pri-
vate-private partnerships (PPPs).
This transition from public to private regulation gives
rise to important new theoretical and political concerns of
legitimacy (Newman 2001; Kersbergen et al. 2001) and
challenges existing conceptualisations of regulation (Black
2002; Sinclair 1997). Public regulation is considered
legitimate because of democratic decision-making proce-
dures on rules, implementation, monitoring and enforce-
ment that are meant to safeguard the proportionality of
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rules and measures, inclusion of all relevant interests and
redress procedures for victims. Most importantly, however,
public regulation is legitimised through its roots in deci-
sions taken (through representatives) by the general public.
This positive evaluation of the legitimacy of public
governance has to be taken with a grain of salt, though.
Legitimacy chains become longer and are more loosely
defined if (elected) governments nominate bureaucrats to
represent them in international negotiations and organiza-
tions. Even more importantly, public regulation in the
international realm frequently takes on the character of a
pursuit of ‘‘private’’ interests with governments trying to
advance the interests of their country (or segments of its
population or economic actors) rather than that of the
global population, as Conzelmann and Wolf (2008) have
convincingly argued. In consequence, when assessing the
democratic legitimacy of private governance in this paper,
we are not meaning to imply that public governance is
definitely unassailable from this perspective and not wor-
thy of inquiry. In this paper, however, we explicitly focus
on the democratic legitimacy of private governance
because we consider it a highly relevant phenomenon in
today’s global food governance which is likely to cause
substantial social transformations and a redistribution of
income and wealth.
Private rules in the form of standards have far reaching
consequences affecting a wide range of actors, such as
consumers and suppliers across the globe. As shown by a
growing number of studies, the implications of private food
governance institutions on the sustainability of the global
food system are ambivalent, if we define sustainability as
including the dimensions of food safety, environmental
well-being, and farmers’ incomes. These implications may
tend to be positive in some aspects such as the food safety
in developed countries but extremely negative in others
(Barrientos et al. 2001; Fuchs et al. 2009; Van der Grijp
et al. 2005). Especially in developing countries, a trend
toward the marginalisation of small farmers and retailers
and subsequently an increase in economic inequality due to
the expansion in private retail standards can be observed.
The latter aspect derives from the situation that these pri-
vate food standards constrain market access (Busch 2000).
The purchasing power of private food actors, in particular
today’s supermarket chains, makes private standards
obligatory for any actor who wants to participate in the
(global) market (Fuchs et al. 2009; Havinga 2006).
Our objective in this article, therefore, is to inquire into
the democratic legitimacy of private retail food gover-
nance. In pursuit of this objective, we apply the criteria of
participation, transparency and accountability proposed by
Porter and Ronit (2010) in an evaluation of a range of
institutions of private retail food governance playing a
prominent role in the global agrifood system today. The
article proceeds as follows. The next section provides the
empirical background to our analysis. It delineates the rise
in private retail food governance, presents prominent
examples of relevant standards and initiatives, and sketches
the ambivalent implications of private retail food gover-
nance for the sustainability of the global agrifood system.
Then, section three turns to the question of democratic
legitimacy and introduces the concepts of participation,
transparency and accountability as criteria for assessing the
democratic legitimacy of private (retail food) governance.
The section also scrutinizes and dismisses alternative cri-
teria, in particular output legitimacy. Section four pursues
the empirical analysis of the democratic legitimacy of
private retail food governance on the basis of the criteria
developed in section three. Finally, section five concludes
our article by summarizing our findings and delineating
their implications for research and policy.
Background: the rise of private retail food governance
and the sustainability of the global agrifood system
In today’s global food governance, private actors, in par-
ticular corporations, play a larger role than ever before
(Clapp and Fuchs 2009). In particular, they have become
rule-setters rather than rule-takers and are deciding,
implementing, monitoring and enforcing rules and regula-
tions to an increasing extent. Such ‘‘private governance’’
can take a variety of forms ranging from Corporate Social
Responsibility initiatives to self-regulation to co-regulation
(e.g. Public–Private Partnerships) and may encompass a
wide variety of instruments such as voluntary and coop-
erative agreements, codes of conduct, corporate reporting,
as well as accounting and self-auditing. As one of the key
developments in recent years, big supermarket chains have
developed initiatives to ensure a certain quality of retail
food products by committing suppliers to a specified set of
standards. Importantly, private governance institutions, in
general, and private retail food governance institutions, in
particular, frequently tend to acquire a de facto compulsory
role despite their de jure voluntary nature (Blowfield
2005). By adopting such standards, private food companies
and especially retail corporations can constrain market
access and thereby basically force suppliers to accept them
(Busch 2000; Fulponi 2006; Havinga 2006).1 Table 1
provides a brief summary of some prominent institutions of
private retail food governance today.
1 In consequence, the term ‘‘self-regulation’’ under which these
standards are being discussed in the literature is highly misleading.
The standards tend to have significant implications for a large group
of stakeholders and impose costs on suppliers, in particular.
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Table 1 Prominent private retail food standards and initiatives
The British Retail Consortium Global Standard for Food Safety (BRC) was created in 1998 in order to evaluate the manufacturing of
retailers’ own brand products. It delineates more than 250 requirements including comprehensive norms for food safety and quality
schemes, products and process management as well as personal hygiene of personnel. In 2002, a Packaging Standard was published,
followed by a Consumer Products standard in 2003 and finally the BRC Standard for Storage and Distribution in 2006. The last standard
addresses companies’ storage and/or distribution of food, consumer goods and packaging materials. Each of these standards is revised and
updated at least every 3 years. For most UK and Scandinavian retailers, BRC certification is required in order to consider business with
suppliers (http://www.ceres-cert.com/en_brc.html, 24-11-2008)
The International Food Standard (IFS) is a standard developed by retailers and wholesalers to ensure the safety of own-brand products. It
covers common internationally accepted audit standards with the aim to improve safety for the consumers. IFS was initiated in 2002 by
German food retailers from the primary association of retailers HDE (Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels). In 2003, French food
retailers (and wholesalers) from the FCD (Fe`deration des entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution) joined the IFS Working Group.
The development of the current version of IFS Food, (version 5) is a collaboration of three retail federations from Germany, France and
Italy. Retailers from Austria, Poland, Spain and Switzerland also support IFS as their food safety standard. The IFS Food standard deals
with processing of food and contains 250 requirements divided over 5 chapters. Next to production process (product specifications, pest
control, traceability), management responsibility (e.g. corporate policy), quality management system (HACCP, recordkeeping), resource
management (personnel hygiene) and measurements and improvements (internal audit, product recall), the standard also contains an audit
protocol
Safe Quality Food (SQF) is a food safety and quality certification program for primary production (SQF 1000) and for food manufacturing
and distribution (SQF 2000) owned by the Food Marketing Institute (FMI). The FMI membership represents three-quarters of all retail
food stores in the US and 200 companies from over 50 countries. The SQF program was developed in 1994 by the West-Australian
Department of Agriculture and sold to American FMI in 2003. SQF is designed as a food safety program and incorporates product quality.
Certification is annual at three levels: food safety fundamentals (only for low risk products), certified HACCP food safety plans and
comprehensive quality management systems development. After achieving level 3 a certified supplier is authorized to use the SQF
certification trademark. ‘Responsible environmental practice’ and ‘responsible social practice’ are optional modules for suppliers ‘whose
markets require additional assurances of responsible environmental and social practice’
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) was initiated in 2000 by a group of international retailers in order to agree on globally accepted
food safety standards. The initiative sets baseline requirements for food safety standards and intends to improve efficiency costs throughout
the food chain. Its central aim is to strengthen consumer confidence in food bought in retail outlets. By now, four food safety standards
have been benchmarked to be in compliance with the GFSI Guidance Document: BRC, Dutch HACCP, IFS, and SQF. GFSI’s aim is to
have all products sold meet this standard. In 2006, a survey of the world’s leading supermarkets found that 75–99% of food supplies sold
by them are certified against a GFSI benchmarked standard (Fulponi 2006)
The Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGap) (known as EurepGap until 2007) was developed in 1997 by a group of
European retailers. While initially only applying to fruits and vegetables, it now covers meat products and fish from aquaculture as well.
Completion and verification of a checklist consisting of 254 questions is required in order to acquire Global-Gap certification. This
checklist is divided into 41 ‘‘major musts’’, 122 ‘‘minor musts’’ as well as 91 recommendations (‘‘shoulds’’). Traceability and food safety
are covered by major must practices while minor musts cover animal welfare issues and environmental concerns in the context of human
health, e.g. release of toxins. Environmental conservation practices fall in the category of recommendations
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is a label for sustainable fishery, created in 1997 as a result of an agreement between Unilever and
the WWF. The idea behind MSC is to address world-wide decline in fish stocks by awarding sustainably managed fisheries with a
certification and a label that could be affixed to retail products (Ponte 2007:161). The standard is based on 3 principles (maintenance of the
target fish stock, minimal environmental impact and effective management) and 31 performance indicators. It can be applied to a wide
range of fisheries found across the world coasts, oceans and freshwater bodies (Leadbitter et al. 2006). At the moment, MSC aims at
specific fisheries rather than species that could come from multiple fisheries and does not cover aquaculture (Iles 2007). Moreover, it is
currently quite small in its fishery coverage and is mostly active in Europe but its endorsement by major retailers is expected to change this
situation in the future (Iles 2007)
The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) was formed in 1998 by UK trade union representatives of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the
International Textile Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), and of NGOs, such as Oxfam and CAFOD (Hughes 2001: 422). UK supermarkets participated in the initiative since its inception
(Smith and Barrientos 2005) and currently all but one of the major British supermarkets are part of the initiative (http://www.ethicaltrade.
org/Z/abteti/who/memb/list.shtml#co). ETI aims to develop an agreed baseline code of conduct covering employment conditions among
companies, unions and NGOs, and examining how systems of monitoring and verification can be established on the basis of ILO core
conventions and UN human rights’ standards. As a UK initiative, its ultimate goal is to ensure that the working conditions of workers
producing for the UK market at least meet international labour standards. ETI is a code of conduct applying to food products as well as to
other products such as clothing. Scholars note that the ETI should be distinguished from fair trade or alternative trade in that it does not
only cover small producers and it does not carry a specific seal of approval, although companies can advertise it if they want to (Smith and
Barrientos 2005). Rather, it is based on a company applying a code to its suppliers in the same way as it applies other conditions of supply
covering production and product specification (ibid.)
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Given the proliferation of private governance institu-
tions in the area of agriculture and food, their implications
for the sustainability of the global agrifood system become
crucial. As previous research has found, however, these
impacts differ in terms of the dimensions of sustainability
considered, i.e. food safety, environmental sustainability,
social sustainability, and in terms of the distribution of
target group considered, i.e. consumers in developed or
developing countries (Barrientos et al. 2001; Fuchs et al.
2009; Van der Grijp et al. 2005).2
Most private retail food standards address issues of food
safety, which accordingly has improved in the food chain.3
These positive effects exist mainly for consumers in the
industrialized countries and perhaps wealthy consumers in
developing countries, however. While optimistic observers
note that higher standards for export markets can lead to
spillover effects for domestic food safety in developing
countries (Jaffee and Henson 2004), critical scholars report
that the new retail standards lead to an increasing gap in
quality between export and domestic food products (Van
der Grijp et al. 2005).
Environmental dimensions of sustainability tend to play
a much less prominent role. Retailers are increasingly
under pressure to improve at least their environmental
performance, of course. Yet, many private standards
evaluating retail environmental performance cover only
particular goods or companies and do not apply to the
sector as a whole (Lang and Barling 2007). Moreover, food
retail standards—to the extent that they cover environ-
mental issues at all—address selected elements of envi-
ronmental protection only, often determined by visibility
and marketing qualities for consumers in the North. Of the
initiatives presented above only the MSC awards envi-
ronment a truly prominent role. For other initiatives
claiming to pay significant attention to environmental
issues as well, such as the GlobalGap, most specifications
for environmental conservation are recommendations (see
GlobalGap 2008) and non-compliance does not always
prevent certification.4 More importantly, the emphasis on
various sustainability issues within the GlobalGap initia-
tive has gradually decreased from its launch until today
(Van der Grijp et al. 2005).5
The social dimension of sustainability, even if formally
included in mainstream retail standards, receives the least
attention (e.g. GlobalGap). While some standards address
issues of worker welfare, other social implications, in
particular the income and well-being of farmers in devel-
oping countries, are left out.6 This is particular noteworthy,
as these implications are significant indeed. Critical
observers associate the proliferation of private retail stan-
dards with dramatic income losses and restrictions in
market access for small farmers and enterprises, who
cannot afford the high implementation costs (Brown and
Sander 2007; Ponte 2007).7 Even significant efforts such as
the ETI fail to recognize crucial societal issues, such as the
different priorities for female workers and farmers stem-
ming from the gendered nature of women’s obligations to
meet domestic and household commitments as well as their
employment related responsibilities (Pearson 2007). In
sum, private retail food standards are creating trends in
employment and income that result in highly uneven and
unequal development in the producing countries and
regions and imply the degradation of social well-being for
a substantial share of the population there (Van der Grijp
et al. 2005).
To summarise, private retail food governance tends to
have positive effects on food safety and some quality. With
regard to developing countries, however, this is limited to
food products for export markets. Likewise, private food
governance can foster some environmental improvements,
although not as systematically and comprehensively as one
would desire. What private food governance does not foster
2 One can also differentiate sustainability implications for wealthy
and poor consumers in developed and especially developing
countries.
3 Quality has not necessarily improved in parallel, however, as the
schemes do not address questions of distance travelled and its
implications, for instance. Due to these distances, fruits and
vegetables are picked early from the field and need to be artificially
gassed to ripe, for example. Moreover, the need to have strong
varieties which will survive the early harvest and transport and have a
long shelf-life frequently creates products end up ‘‘relatively tasteless,
nutritionally weak’’ (Robison 1984: 289). At the same time, quality
standards assure that at least some level of quality is maintained,
however.
4 In GlobalGap, for major norms 100% compliance is compulsory,
whereas for minor norms this is 95%. Recommendations are
Footnote 4 continued
inspected but are not a prerequisite for the granting of a GlobalGAP
certificate (Van der Grijp 2008, p. 122).
5 There are other examples with more ambitious goals, such as Farm
Biodiversity Action Plans (Sainsboury’s for premium fresh produce
suppliers), conservation plans linked to FWAG (Tesco’s Natures
Choice), and the development of additional audit requirements for the
Assured Produce Scheme linked to the LEAF audit (Waitrose’s LEAF
Marque Brand) on the environmental side (Baines 2005). Yet, these
standards have an extremely small market share.
6 Similarly, capital concentration in the retail sector and the global
expansion of the operations of the large retail chains are threatening
the livelihoods of smaller local retailers as well. This trend is
particularly recognizable in regions currently targeted by expansion
strategies of retail corporations such as Eastern Europe and Asia.
7 Reardon et al. (2001) report, for instance, that thousands of small
dairy operations have gone out of business in the past five years in the
extended Mercosur area, because the new quality and safety standards
for milk and milk products implied large investments in equipment
and buildings and coordination and management. Likewise, NGOs
have pointed out that hundreds of thousands of small farmers in
Africa are losing or will lose their living in the wake of the
implementation of the GlobalGap standards (ActionAid 2005).
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and in fact tends to worsen, however, is the aspect of the
social sustainability of the global agrifood system. It is due
to these costs, which private retail food governance
imposes on the sustainability of the global agrifood system,
in particular, that its democratic legitimacy needs to be
assessed.
The democratic legitimacy of private food retail
governance
Any attempt to offer a democratic assessment of private
governance with traditional notions of democracy will fail
as fundamental democracy requirements are violated.
Retailers, as any other private actor, are not democratically
elected and cannot be held responsible by a relatively
homogenous demos, since such a public rarely exists at the
global level (Bru¨hl 2002). Instead of abandoning demo-
cratic principles when entering the global private sphere,
however, we argue in favour of moving away from the
domestic analogy and adopting alternative criteria for
democratic checks and balances (see also Keohane 2006).
Different interpretations of democracy beyond the state
can be identified in the literature. The concepts of ‘‘cos-
mopolitan democracy’’ (Held 1995) or ‘‘discursive
democracy’’ (Dryzek 1990), for instance, offer useful
insights for democratic forms of global governance based
on notions of global citizenship and discursive practices.
Yet these approaches also suffer from a number of short-
comings that make their applicability in the cases examined
here problematic. More specifically, the emphasis on pri-
vate actors, especially business, is often lacking and they
tend to be too philosophical to allow for the identification
of concrete democratic challenges (Porter and Ronit 2010).
We evaluate the democratic legitimacy of private food
retail governance institutions using the criteria of partici-
pation, transparency and accountability (Schaller 2007).
These three dimensions are widely recognised values and
offer strong analytical advantages in the study of private
institutions from a democratic perspective (Porter and
Ronit 2010). Moreover, they are well suited to study highly
complex environments that are associated with transna-
tional corporate activities, and new modes of democratic
policy-making evolving alongside traditional institutions
(ibid.).
Participation should include all the actors who are
potentially affected by the decisions to ensure their
autonomy under law, according to procedural arguments.
At the most fundamental level, participation requires
access to information and decision-making. Three broad
categories of actors can be involved in private retail food
governance: state actors, business actors and civil society
organisations. These represent the actors directly or
indirectly affected by the relevant regulations and stan-
dards. Private food governance institutions affect a wide
variety of stakeholders ranging from the farmer to the
consumer. Business and the general public, or civil society
organizations as the representatives of the latter, are those
actors directly affected by private food governance. State
actors are indirectly affected (except for the case of co-
regulation in the form of public–private partnerships) as
private regulation always interacts and sometimes inter-
feres with public regulation and in so far as the private
regulation has consequences for the need of state inter-
vention.8 With respect to business actors, one needs to
differentiate between retailers and food producers and
processors in this respect, as well as consider those busi-
ness actors providing services to the industry such as cer-
tification and auditing companies. With regards to civil
society, environmental and development NGOs as well as
labour organisations are typical representatives. Next to the
type of actors involved, attention needs to be paid with
respect to their region of origin, when assessing the dem-
ocratic legitimacy of private retail food governance insti-
tutions. Specifically, one needs to consider the distribution
in decision making power between representatives of the
South and those of the North.9
We evaluate participation as a criterion for the legiti-
macy of private retail food governance in terms of the
participatory roles awarded to the different groups by a
given governance institution. In our evaluation, we con-
centrate on the actors directly affected by the institutions,
i.e. the different types of business actors as well as civil
society representatives and their region of origin. These
actors may be given decision-making power in the central
governing organ of the private governance institution. They
may be provided with access to meetings of this organ, but
have only a consulting status. Finally, they may be exclu-
ded from the meetings altogether. Participation as a crite-
rion for the democratic legitimacy of a private food
governance institution would require that all of the groups
affected by that institutions need to receive decision-
making power in the central governing organ of the
institution.
Transparency refers to the provision of timely, reliable
and comprehensible information on the governance and
8 The private regulation may increase/decrease wealth in certain
sectors of society, for instance, leading for more or less need for
welfare provisioning by the state.
9 This aspect becomes somewhat difficult, when talking about
developmental NGOs, of course. Frequently, their stated objective
is the representation of the interests of the population or specific
segments of the population in developing countries, while their
decision-making organs are dominated by individuals from developed
countries. This difficulty should not lead to a neglect of the question
of the distribution in decision making power between North and
South in a private food governance institution, in general.
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performance characteristics of the standards. It is an
important dimension of legitimacy because it enhances
public scrutiny and visibility in complex environments,
thereby also strengthening meaningful participation and
ensuring accountability. Transparency can be internal and
external, i.e. information available only to members and
information available to the general public. We are specif-
ically interested in the external aspect of transparency
examining access to information by stakeholders not par-
ticipating in the ownership of the standards but directly or
indirectly affected by them. Such stakeholders include, for
instance, the ‘‘governed’’, i.e. farmers and farmer workers,
as well as civil society organisations and the general public.
We evaluate transparency on the basis of information
provided on the standards’ websites, as well as access to
conferences and other meetings organised by the standard
owners (see also Schaller 2007). Governance related
transparency means access to information on decision-
making structures and processes. Performance related
transparency means access to information on the associated
(public) benefits gained by the implementation of the
standard, for instance, in the context of food safety and/or
environmental sustainability. We also reflect on the stan-
dards’ issue coverage as selective transparency can obscure
the visibility of the standards’ full range of impacts, thus
fostering a partial appraisal of the standards’ role in the
agri-food system. The focus on food safety, for instance,
can shift interest away from sustainability ‘‘externalities’’
along the supply chain.
We consider transparency timely when there is reference
to recent events, projects etc. as well as when critical
information is available before important decisions have
been made. Reliability of information depends on the
existence of external mechanisms of information control
instead of simply self-reporting activities on a voluntary
basis. Regarding comprehensibility, given the global cov-
erage of standards and the diverse audiences affected by
them, we consider the language of communication of
information and the level of technical detail and discourse
important parameters. We expect differences in the visi-
bility of standards between Northern and Southern publics,
however, as transparency is also subject to technological
and financial constraints.
Finally, accountability is a fundamental prerequisite for
the exercise of democratic control over governance insti-
tutions. Accountability is needed in terms of the internal
and external auditing of regulations and standards, and
more crucially, in terms of the relationship between the
governance institution and the affected stakeholders or the
general public. It is the fundamental idea of democratic
governance that the affected public should be able to hold
decision-makers accountable and ‘‘vote’’ them out of office
if a given governance institution performs badly.
In liberal democracies, accountability is ensured through
mechanisms of representation, rights of legislators to
scrutinise and hold public servants accountable, and public
answerability of governmental agencies and officials
(Gulbrandsen 2008). Public law, however, is not the only
source of accountability. In private governance arrange-
ments, internal accountability is ensured through delega-
tions, e.g. corporate CEOs are responsible to their board of
directors who are responsible to stockholders (Keohane
2006). More difficult, though not impossible, is to achieve
external accountability, where organizations are held
accountable not to those who delegated power to them but
to those affected by their decisions. In that context, Furger
(1997, p. 449) underlines the ‘‘role of intermediary
organisations as institutions that are particularly suited to
develop and maintain standards of accountability’’. In other
words, actors, whom those governed by an institution trust
in terms of the neutrality of perspective and expertise, can
be awarded the role of operating the instruments in place to
hold the ‘‘governors’’ accountable. In relation to the
discussed examples of private governance, intermediary
organisations who could potentially play such a role are
auditing organisations and certification bodies, for
example.
Auditing or third party certification mechanisms provide
checks and balances regarding the standards’ violation
codes but they do not necessarily extend this accountability
to farmers and farm workers (see also Schaller 2007).
Moreover, these mechanisms do not cover the public
affected by the externalities of the standards, for instance,
in their environmental and particularly social dimensions.
In consequence, additional mechanisms of intervention that
can strengthen the external accountability of the standards
are required.
Accordingly, we evaluate internal accountability in
terms of the existence of responsibility mechanisms from
board members to their constituencies and civil society
representatives to their organisations. We evaluate external
accountability in terms of the presence of an independent
and trusted actor, who is awarded the authority and
instruments to regularly conduct checks of the performance
of the given private retail food governance institution.
Moreover, we define the ability of the affected public or its
representatives to intervene and adjust the governance
institution as a prerequisite for accountability.
Having defined participation, transparency, and
accountability, in this manner, we are setting high bench-
marks for our evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of
private retail food governance, of course. One can easily
point out that public international governance frequently
does not completely fulfill these requirements either.
Again, our aim in this analysis is not to paint a black and
white picture of private versus public food governance.
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Rather, we consider private food governance to be such an
important phenomenon that we want to explore its demo-
cratic legitimacy in its own right. Specifically, we want to
identify areas in which private retail food governance
performs well from the perspective of democratic legiti-
macy and areas in which notable problems exist. Moreover,
we want to compare this situation against different types of
private retail food governance institutions. Only on the
basis of such insights can one then discuss ways to improve
the democratic legitimacy of private food governance.
Why not output legitimacy?
Before we proceed with the analysis, a note has to be made
regarding alternative concepts of evaluating the democratic
legitimacy of private governance. Some scholars have
suggested the concepts of input, output and throughput
legitimacy here (Erman and Uhlin forthcoming; Scharpf
1998). Input legitimacy refers to the criterion of partici-
pation, while throughput legitimacy tends to be interpreted
as combining aspects of transparency, responsiveness, and
fairness of the procedures of a governance institution.
Thus, the concept of input legitimacy is covered by our
criteria as well. The problem with the concept of
throughput legitimacy is the combination of the aspects of
transparency and responsiveness (or in our terms
accountability), as well as of positive and normative cri-
teria, which inhibit its systematic empirical application.
The major problem, however, exists with respect to the
concept of output legitimacy, especially as it frequently is
used as a justification for the democratic legitimacy of
private governance, but applied in very sweeping and
superficial terms. This handling of the concept and its
empirical application serves to hide its fundamental prob-
lems. Yet, these problems exist and need to be named.
The concept of output legitimacy refers to the notion
that legitimacy can arise from the ability to provide results
rather than from the existence of participatory norms and
procedures or the presence of checks and balances (Scharpf
1998). Put differently, the ‘‘effectiveness’’ of a governance
institution functions as a source of legitimacy, here. To the
extent, then, that private governance is as or more effective
than public governance, it could be considered as having
output legitimacy.
It is extremely difficult if not impossible to assess the
effectiveness of a private governance institution, however.
Assessing effectiveness requires the definition of objec-
tives, against which the performance of the governance
institution can be evaluated. Yet, different stakeholders
will tend to define different objectives, or even similar
objectives differently. As we argue below, different actors
in the food chain tend to define very different sustainability
criteria, for instance. In other words, the objectives of a
private governance institution cannot be consensually
defined without a prior process of discussion and negotia-
tion. Accordingly, effectiveness cannot be objectively
measured without such a process either. In other words, a
participatory, transparent and responsive deliberative pro-
cess to define the objectives, involving all affected stake-
holders, remains necessary, which returns us to the criteria
of participation, transparency and accountability defined
above.10
Applying these general ideas to the topic private retail
food governance, we find the following. Different stake-
holders define the objectives of private retail standards very
differently, even though they all tend to broadly refer to
sustainability objectives (Kalfagianni 2006). Retailers
themselves will define sustainability in terms of food safety
(narrowly defined) and therefore argue that traceability
schemes will allow an effective achievement of this
objective. Environmental, consumer, and animal welfare
organisations will add environmental and/or animal wel-
fare objectives to the sustainability dimensions required.
Accordingly, retail standards focussing on traceability will
fail to provide the desired output in their view. Small
farmers in developing countries surely would want to add
the aspect of farmer income and rural livelihoods to the
sustainability. However, they tend not to get asked (see
below).
Assessing the democratic legitimacy of private retail
food governance
In order to assess the democratic legitimacy of private
retail food governance, we analyzed websites and docu-
mentation published by the standard owners as well as
other stakeholders, drew on existing scientific studies, and
conducted expert interviews with certification agencies and
quality managers of supermarket chains to gather sup-
porting evidence. The heavy reliance on information pro-
vided by the standard owners themselves may give rise to
concern from a methodological perspective, of course. In
the case of our inquiry, however, such a concern should
only exist if we arrived at highly positive evaluations of the
democratic legitimacy of the given governance institutions.
After all, one would not expect the standard owners to
intentionally undersell the democratic legitimacy of their
10 Sometimes, participants in the debate will suggest to simply assess
the effectiveness of the governance institution against its self-set
objectives. This process, however, does not provide a way out of the
above dilemma. After all, institutions may set objectives for
themselves that neglect or even hurt the interests of those governed.
In such a situation, the achievement of the self-set objectives can
hardly function as a source of democratic legitimacy.
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institutions. As the discussion below shows, however, we
do not find positive results for the democratic legitimacy of
almost all of the private retail food governance institutions
analyzed, when applying our criteria of participation,
transparency and accountability.
Participation
Institutions of private retail food governance differ in their
governance structures and roles awarded to different
stakeholders. Using this difference in governance structure,
one can place these institutions along a continuum ranging
from retailer dominated ones, to joint retailer-producer
initiatives, to multi-stakeholder initiatives. Table 2 shows
how the private retail food governance institutions intro-
duced above fall on this continuum.
Most of the retail standards presented in this paper
strongly prioritise retail access. BRC, IFS, SQF, and GFSI
in particular are exclusively retailer organisations, allow-
ing other stakeholders such as food manufacturers only a
consultative role.
BRC started as a pure retail standard but over the years
other stakeholders became involved as well. Today, rep-
resentatives from major retailers, manufacturers, certifica-
tion bodies, the United Kingdom Accreditation Service
(UKAS) and trade associations are involved in the devel-
opment of the standard through the Technical Advisory
Committee and the Standards Governance and Strategy
Committee.11 It is clear, however, that British retailers still
have a decisive voice since the standard is owned by BRC.
Similar observations can be made about the IFS and SQF.
The SQF standard is owned by FMI, an American orga-
nisation of retailers and wholesalers. The Technical
Advisory council 2008–2009 has 28 members including 11
retailers and six food manufacturers, predominantly from
the USA (22).12 Also in IFS, the main decision-making
bodies, the Board and the International Working Group,
give access to (German, French and Italian) retailers only.
Other stakeholders, in particular manufacturers and certi-
fication bodies, participate in the Review Committee which
has an advisory role.13
The GFSI Board of Directors, the main decision-making
body, is still dominated by retailers (13 out of 16 members)
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11 www.brc.org.uk/standards/default.asp?mainsection_i=1&subsection_
id=1 (28-3-2008); similar but not mentioning UKAS: www.brc.
org.uk/standards/about_background.htm (18-02-2005). The BRC web-
site does not provide a list of members of these committees.
12 www.sqfi.com/tac_members.htm (14-4-2009). Three members of
the TAC are from Australia and 1 from Japan, UK, Canada.
13 www.ifs-online.eu (28-4-2009) Names of Review Committee
members are not available on the website.
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mainly from Europe and USA.14 Since September 2006 the
Technical Committee, advising the Board, includes other
stakeholders. Since April 2009, 60 organisations are rep-
resented in the Technical Committee including 19 retailers,
21 certification bodies, standard owners or accreditation
organisation and 11 food manufacturers.15 Even there,
however, most are from Europe (38) or the USA (16).
Membership in the Board and Technical Committee is by
invitation only.
Concluding, BRC, IFS, SQF and GFSI are dominated by
retailers’ organisations, allowing food industry and certi-
fication bodies to be represented in the committee that
reviews the standard and makes recommendations on
improvements to the Board. Consumer organisations and
other NGOs are not included in the decision structure of
retail standards. GFSI is the only one with some food
industry representatives on the Board and with a structure
for information exchange with civil society; it invites all
interested parties that want a voice in GFSI to participate in
annual meetings.
From 1997, EurepGap developed from a European
retailer initiative into GlobalGap, a global standard, with
equal participation for retailers and agricultural producers.
More specifically, both the Steering Committee and the
GlobaGap Sector Committees have had 50% retailer and
50% supplier representation since 2001. GlobalGap is a
membership organization. The Committees are constituted
by members, elected by closed ballot of current retailer and
supplier members. Each constituency elects its own rep-
resentatives. Next to retailers and suppliers, associate
members from the input and service side of agriculture can
also participate but are not part of the decision making
process. In 2009, GlobalGap still has these three different
types of memberships: 42 retail and food service members
(European except for 1 Japanese and 2 US), 149 producer/
supplier members (41 from outside Europe) and 100
associate members such as certification bodies, consulting
and crop protection industry.16 Only 8 producer/supplier
members are from Africa, 7 from Asia and 16 from Central
and South America. In the sector committee for crops
responsible for revising the standard, 4 out of 16 producer
members are from Kenia and Brazil. The majority of both
retailer and producer members in this committtee is from
Europe (17 out of 25). However, in 2007 GlobalGap has
started a special project to provide more opportunities for
African smallholder representation in the standard setting
process.17 In addition, to facilitate GlobalGap certification
for small producers it is now possible to get a group cer-
tification as a farmer group.
The ETI and MSC, finally, can be considered multis-
takeholder initiatives. The MSC developed from a part-
nership between Unilever and WWF into a
multistakeholder organization. The initial governance
structure of MSC (partnership between Unilever en WWF)
was criticized by NGOs as lacking credibility, democratic
representativity and effectiveness (Tully 2004:3). Since
2000, the MSC is governed by the Board of Trustees
comprised of global fisheries experts who approve plans,
targets, strategies, financial accountability, and appoint
chief board and committee members (Owens 2008). MSC
is not a membership organization. Trustees are not elected
but appointed by cooptation.18 Almost all trustees are from
the USA, Europe or Australia (1 from Latin America),
although some of them are focusing on fisheries in Africa
or the Southern Ocean. Other institutional organs of the
MSC include the Technical Advisory Board and the
Stakeholder Council which advise the Board. In addition to
the three governance bodies, committees and working
groups are set up to address specific regional or topical
issues. Their members come from the MSC Board, Tech-
nical Advisory Board and Stakeholder Council, and may
include other experts who are invited to advise the MSC
(http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure). Even
though the MSC has a multistakeholder governance
structure, the highest decision-making authority is granted
to the Board of Trustees, which is self-recruiting and
functions much like a corporate board of directors, rather
than a stakeholder council (Gulbrandsen 2008). Moreover,
critical commentators observe discrimination in access to
representatives from developing countries (Ponte 2007).
Even the Stakeholder Council counts only four members in
the ‘‘developing world category’ (next to 11 in the ‘public
interest category’ and 16 in the ‘commercial and socio-
economic category’).19 It is further noted that only one of
about ten workshops carried out since 1997 took place in a
developing country (South Africa) (Ponte 2007).20 MSC
has initiated efforts to overcome such criticisms by intro-
ducing special programs to improve developing countries’
access to MSC certification and global sustainable seafood
14 The Board has six members from Europe, seven from USA and
one from China, Japan and Brazil. Three board members are from
food industry (additionally two adviser members from industry).
http://www.ciesnet.com (28-4-2009).
15 http://www.ciesnet.com (28-4-2009).
16 http://www2.globalgap.org (28-4-2009).
17 http://www.africa-observer.info/ (28-4-2009).
18 In April 2009, MSC had 4 trustees from fishing industry, 3 from
environmental NGOs (WWF), 3 from science, 2 from retail, 1
miscellaneous. (www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure/board-
of-trustees/whos-on-the-msc-board, 29-4-2009).
19 http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure/msc-stakeholder-
council/whos-on-the-msc-stakeholder-council (29-4-2009).
20 Recently a ‘‘Sustainable Fisheries Fund’’ has been set up,
independently from MSC, to help developing country fisheries to
go through the certification process (Ponte 2007).
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markets, and assist small scale fisheries to gain access to
data and resources needed for certification. Even though
these efforts might improve market access, they do not
guarantee more equal representation in decision-making
processes, however.21
The ETI includes a wide range of stakeholders in its
board, as well. With board members equally spread over
three caucus groups (each with 3 members on the board),
ETI allows for the most participation of civil society (2 out
of 3 member categories: trade unions and developmental
NGOs). In 2007, 39 companies, four trade unions (TU) and
17 NGOs were part of the ETI (Schaller 2007). The NGOs
are represented by larger organizations (e.g. Oxfam, CA-
FOD) and smaller, specialized NGOs (e.g. Anti-slavery
International, Woman Working Worldwide), often with a
focus on development or human rights issues. Among TU
members are the International Trade Union Confederation
(ITUC) and the International Textile, Garment and Leather
Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF) (ETI 2007; Schaller
2007). Concerns are voiced, however, about access con-
straints of developing countries due to limited resources
(Schaller 2007), irregular consultation with workers (Hale
2000; Hale and Shaw 2001) and unequal power structures
between UK retailers and suppliers from developing
countries (Hughes 2001).
In sum, all private retail standards tend to lack demo-
cratic legitimacy from the perspective of the participation
criterion to some extent. The decision-making bodies fre-
quently do not allow participation by all groups affected by
these standards. Multistakeholder initiatives can be con-
sidered more legitimate because they bring together dif-
ferent actors with opposing interests trying to reach an
agreement on crucial societal issues. It is important to note
that resource asymmetries still prevent equal participation,
even if certain stakeholders are allowed participation,
however. In consequence, there is a lack of sufficient
participation by representatives of consumers, developing
countries, and environmental and labour organizations in
all private retail food governance institutions considered
here. The degree of the severity of the problem clearly
varies, however, with retail dominated private governance
institutions reflecting the lowest degree of democratic
legitimacy.
Transparency
In the cases examined here, the main source of information
regarding the standards is the web. Up to date information
on governance structures, membership and goals is avail-
able though some standards, especially GlobalGap, MSC
and ETI, have more extensive and detailed coverage than
others. In contrast, BRC is the standard with the most
limited information on its governance structure. In all cases
most of the documents related to the development and
monitoring of standards are only available to insiders,
however. Likewise, information on the processes them-
selves, especially while they are going on, is rarely avail-
able. In addition, information to the general public is only
provided after decisions have been made, constraining
meaningful intervention from the part of civil society.
In retail dominated standards transparency tends to be
selective. These standards strive for food safety while
ignoring other aspects, such as environmental and social
performance, which are crucial indicators for the sustain-
ability of the food system. Performance related informa-
tion, however, is available to a certain extent. Thus, an
interested party can learn about the number of certified
producers, for instance, and their geographical coverage.
The contribution of the standards to food safety concerns is
also explained; detailed statistical information on the
effectiveness of standards in preventing food scares or
spreading of diseases is not accessible, however. Moreover,
there is no external evaluation of the standards’
performance.
Equal partnership standards including environmental
and social performance criteria also need to report on their
performance. In that context, GlobalGap holds a series of
‘‘Success Stories’’ where it presents its social and market
impact including the launching of new certificates, pilot
projects, and corporate social responsibility initiatives. As
these stories constitute selected elements they do not rep-
resent the overall GlobalGap performance, however.
Moreover, similar to the previous cases such reporting is
voluntary and has not undergone external evaluations.
Multistakeholder initiatives also suffer from selective
transparency and performance deficiencies, but less so in
relation to the other standards. MSC has been criticised, for
instance, for not providing any details on catch patterns,
patterns of industry adoption of practices, by-catch and
habitat damage problems and individual producer activities
(Iles 2007). However, since 2005 MSC has initiated an
effort to undergo evaluation and report on its environ-
mental impact while it currently collaborates with the
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and
Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance to explore the development of
a Code of Good Practice on Measuring the Impact of
Certification.22 Finally, even the ETI fails to recognize and
therefore provide information on important issues such as
gendered aspects of employment, as discussed earlier
(Pearson 2007). Similar to the MSC, however, ETI also
21 http://www.msc.org/about-us/credibility/working-with-developing-
countries (29-4-2009).
22 http://www.msc.org/about-us/credibility/measuring-environmental-
impacts (14-05-2009).
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voluntarily undergoes external evaluation of its perfor-
mance. More specifically, a study completed by the Uni-
versity of Sussex in 2006 reveals to the public the
heterogeneous impact of ETI depending on companies and
type of workers (Barrientos and Smith 2006). Moreover,
ETI also includes reports on pilot projects from the side of
the regulatees, hosting some quite critical voices (Turner
2004). These types of transparency activities, in turn,
improve the reliability of information provided by the
standard owners and also enhance the standards’
accountability.
Next to the web, seminars and conferences are held as
well. Here openness and availability of information also
differs among the standards. More specifically, those with
strong retail participation (e.g. BRC, SQF, and IFS) allow
access only to members. GFSI allows participation of other
stakeholders, such as other companies’ executives as well
as suppliers’ senior sales and marketing management per-
sonnel. In contrast, GlobalGap, MSC and ETI are open to
the public upon registration. Moreover, they allow access
to minutes of conferences, round tables and short video
archives. ETI and MSC also publish information on their
board meetings. However, in those cases too no protocols
of caucus group meetings are available (see also Schaller
2007).
The language used is mostly non-technical facilitating
the comprehensibility of information. The majority of
sources is in English, although all standards are translated
into other languages. Thus, BRC is translated into fifteen
languages, such as Arabic, Chinese, Thai and many Euro-
pean languages. Likewise, SQF is also translated into
Spanish. Some standards also include information in
additional languages in their websites. Thus, next to Eng-
lish, GFSI also has reports in French, Spanish, Japanese
and Chinese. Likewise, IFS reports in English, German,
French and Chinese. GlobalGap publishes information in a
number of European (Dutch, English, French, German,
Greek, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish) and non-European
(Turkish and Thai) languages. MSC includes information
in English, French, German, Spanish, and Chinese. Finally,
ETI publishes some documents in Spanish and Chinese as
well, while further translations are expected to follow
(Schaller 2007). One may question, of course, whether the
predominance of European languages really facilitates
access for all affected stakeholders, especially farmers in
developing countries.
In sum, transparency increases as participation broad-
ens. Retailer dominated standards are less open about their
processes and have limited issue coverage. Moreover,
information provision is voluntary and based on self-
reports. In contrast, standards involving more stakeholders
are relatively more transparent. Detailed information on
governance structures, membership and projects is
available on the web. Moreover, conferences and seminars
are open to all and relevant information is published on the
web, even though board and/or caucus group meetings are
not made public. Even in multistakeholder initiatives,
however, transparency tends to be selective in its sustain-
ability coverage. Yet, the reliability of information is
higher due to external evaluations of the standards’ per-
formance, thus also improving the standards’
accountability.
Accountability
In all cases examined in this paper, stakeholders need to
report on their activities on a somewhat regular basis.
Supermarkets need to report to their boards and board
members to their constituencies, while trade union and
civil society representatives are also accountable to their
organisations. Thus, the standards provide a basis for
internal accountability. The extent to which peer pressure
actually is used to ensure compliance may differ, of course.
However, this is a question on which little information is
publicly available.
We do not find critical differences among the standards
regarding external evaluations of accountability in the
narrow sense. Many private food standards rely on third
party certification for monitoring and enforcing compliance
with the standard. A company wishing to be certified
against BRC, IFS, GlobalGap or MSC, e.g. appoints an
accredited certification body to audit the company. The
certification bodies have to be accredited by independent
accreditation bodies to certify against the standards. With
the exception of SQF, the standard owners do not decide
which organisations are authorized to monitor and enforce
compliance with the standard. Usually a certified company
is audited at least once a year. Some standards also require
or allow unannounced audits. An audit report has to be
technically reviewed prior to the certification decision by
the certification body. The person or body deciding to
grant, suspend, revoke or renew certification should be
independent to the auditor. Critical or major non-confor-
mity against fundamental requirements of the standard
should result in suspending or withholding the certification,
and a new audit has to begin. Minor non-conformities are
followed by corrective action and need to be revisited.
Again, little information on the extent to which these
mechanisms prevent non-complying companies from
becoming certified is available. Moreover, critical observ-
ers point out weaknesses of third-party certification
mechanisms. Thus, the certification bodies also participate
in consulting meetings, working groups, and so on. In most
of the cases, the certification organisations are trained by
the standard owners, while the methodology used in the
certification process is considered intellectual property
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right of the standard, and thus details remain confidential.
In addition, the company wishing to be certified hires the
certification organisation itself which could provide an
incentive to forego rigour in favour of future cooperation
with the company. Finally, the quality of third-party audits
is not always ensured. In the case of ETI, for instance,
members are concerned about the increase of fraudulent
practices in auditing, such as the keeping of false records
(common practice particularly in China) or instructing
workers to provide false information (ETI 2006).
More fundamentally, third party certification mecha-
nisms only aim to ensure compliance with the standard and
thus accountability on the issues covered by the standard at
the most. Even in these cases, the question is to whom
accountability is provided. After all, not everyone affected
by the standard has paths and instruments available to
demand compliance in the case of private retail standards.
In the case of multi-stakeholder initiatives, the group able
to demand accountability is by definition broader. Such
initiatives also have mechanisms by which workers and
suppliers can hold the standards accountable to a certain
extent. Thus, ETI provides an ‘‘Alleged Code Investigation
Guidelines’’ which allows NGOs and TU to forward
complaints from Southern members (ETI 2001). Moreover,
ETI member companies commit to provide secret com-
plaint mechanisms for workers even though few have
actually done so (Turner 2004).
Yet, the analysis of the distribution of participation above
shows that even in multi-stakeholder initiatives not all
groups potentially affected by private food governance
institutions are represented. Moreover, the difficulties in
attaining transparency from a developing country perspec-
tive reinforce access inequality. The effectiveness of ETI
investigation guidelines, for instance, depends on workers
knowing about them, but only few workers have that
knowledge in reality (Schaller 2007). Publication of external
evaluations of standards’ performance could improve
accountability to the general public. Again, these evaluations
are made on the basis of the standards’ own terms of refer-
ences and do not cover externalities or unintended conse-
quences. In sum, external accountability of retail standards is
fundamentally limited and accountability, as such, cannot
serve as a reliable source of democratic legitimacy.
The picture with respect to the accountability of private
retail food governance is mixed, then. Internal and even
narrowly defined external accountability frequently exist.
Indeed, peer-review mechanisms or auditing of standards is
a feature of most of the standards and initiatives considered
here. Yet, accountability to the broad range of affected
stakeholders is given in hardly any institution. In terms of
this broader notion of accountability, then, private retail
food governance institutions tend to exhibit little demo-
cratic legitimacy.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the democratic legitimacy of
private retail food governance, using the criteria of par-
ticipation, transparency and accountability. We pursued
this investigation due to the highly ambivalent implications
that private retail food governance exhibits for the sus-
tainability of the global agrifood system. In our analysis,
we found that the criteria of participation, transparency and
accountability are entirely fulfilled in none of the cases. In
terms of participation, we identified a lack of access in the
development and monitoring of private standards, espe-
cially for civil society actors and small farmers and fish-
ermen, particularly from the South, as an area of high
concern. Interestingly, this is the case even in broad mul-
tistakeholder standards and initiatives, such as ETI and
MSC, which frequently tend to have a better image in the
public (and even in the scientific) debate. Even here,
financial and technological constraints impede the partici-
pation of resource weak actors, however. Moreover, the
power asymmetries among the actors involved in private
retail food governance raise questions about the constraints
on actors’ choice sets even if they are allowed to partici-
pate. In terms of transparency, we found that it is limited in
its external dimension, thus weakening the influence of
actors besides the standard owners. However, differences
exist between the standards, with multistakeholder initia-
tives being considerably more open and reliable in their
reporting. Finally, when it comes to accountability, we
noted that even though internal accountability is provided
in most cases, external accountability to the general public
is either lacking or in need of major improvement.
Indeed, the asymmetries in access and influence
between the different stakeholders highlighted by an
analysis of the three democratic criteria constitute one of
the core challenges for private food governance and exer-
cise an impact not just on the criterium of participation, but
also on questions of transparency and accountability. The
asymmetries in access and influence are also likely to
contribute to the mixed impact on the sustainability of the
global agrifood system that was pointed out earlier. Given
the existence of such asymmetries, it should not come as a
surprise that most private food standards primarily reflect
the interests of retailers in minimizing the risk of scandals
and marketing their products to Northern consumers.
Therefore, the emphasis rests on food safety and trace-
ability. Some environmental and worker welfare issues are
included as well, as Northern consumers place increasing
demands on retailers in this context. The lack of an ade-
quate inclusion of civil society organizations in the retail
dominated schemes, however, means that the standards
tend to address these issues only in a selective manner.
Finally, small farmers in the South have little
364 D. Fuchs et al.
123
representation in the decision-making bodies of most of the
private food governance institutions discussed here and no
means to enforce a pursuit of their interests either.
Some of the initiatives discussed do recognise the power
asymmetry between the rich world and farmers in devel-
oping countries, however. Both GlobalGap and MSC have
pilot programs supporting small producers in developing
countries to overcome financial, educational and other
barriers to certification. Even though such initiatives are
welcome, they tend to be the exception rather than the rule.
Moreover, it will take time to evaluate whether such efforts
constitute effective and sufficient measures to overcome
critical societal concerns.
The result of our analysis of the democratic legitimacy
of private retail food governance, then, is not an optimistic
one. Private food governance may be desirable in a number
of ways. Thus, it has been connected to some improve-
ments in food safety and quality and even to some extent
environmental conditions were achieved. Yet, its potential
negative consequences, for instance in terms of the mar-
ginalization of millions of small farmers in developing
countries, are sufficiently severe to remind us of the
importance of participation, transparency and account-
ability in its creation as well as the need for checks and
balances on the power exercised by the different actors
involved, especially the large retail corporations.
Again, establishing institutions that will fulfil the criteria
of participation, transparency, and accountability in global
food governance is extremely difficult. As pointed out above,
public governance is far from perfect in this respect and one
may wonder if it matters to small farmers in the South if they
lose their livelihoods due to regulations introduced by the EU
or US government or due to the GlobalGap. In other words,
global public food governance clearly warrants critical
questions regarding its democratic legitimacy as well. Yet,
the dramatic expansion in private retail food governance, the
structural power behind it, and its severe social implications
highlight the urgent need to improve the situation. Due to the
obligatory quality private standards assume and their global
coverage, the legitimation of private food governance
becomes a fundamental concern for global governance.
Standards and certification mechanisms need to be estab-
lished in a global market with huge information asymme-
tries, complex production chains and distancing between
production and consumption choices. Yet, the development
and monitoring of standards affecting a multitude of actors in
a multitude of locations, needs to take place in a context
where mechanisms of participation, transparency and
accountability are enforced and fortified.
From a democratic perspective, it is crucial to remember
that the institutionalization of new forms of governance at
the global level is a development in progress. The institu-
tionalization and perfection of these forms does not happen
automatically or overnight. Instead, it requires constant
attention and discussion both at the national and global
levels. It is the responsibility of (democratically elected)
governments worldwide to foster arenas where disputes
and contestations of inadequate forms of governance can
take place. The presence of such arenas constitutes, in turn,
the seed of all democratic transformations.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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